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Efforts to sustain international cooperation invariably culminate
in the signing of an international treaty, the success of which depends
on the acumen of the individuals that negotiate it and the nature of
the problem being addressed.  But, while diplomats can make a dif-
ference, even the cleverest of diplomats cannot be relied upon to sus-
tain first-best outcomes in all cases.  Usually cooperation will be par-
tial and there will be some loss in efficiency.  International co-
operation in these situations is analogous to domestic politics.  De-
mocracy may be the best system of government imaginable, but Ar-
row has taught us that we cannot rely on majority voting to sustain
first-best outcomes every time.1
In international relations, the novel constraint that prevents first-
best outcomes from being realized is sovereignty.  Since participation
in an international treaty is voluntary, agreements that seek to sustain
cooperation must be self-enforcing.2  If the self-enforcement con-
straint bites with enough force (and this will depend on the nature of
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1. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3, 93-96
(2d ed. 1963) (describing the “paradox of voting” and providing some of the intellectual history
of the idea).
2. Participation in an international treaty is voluntary in two senses.  First, a state (coun-
try) is never obligated to participate in the negotiations of a treaty, nor sign or ratify the treaty.
Second, despite the fact that a country that signs and ratifies a treaty becomes obligated to abide
by its terms, a state may not be forced to comply with the commitments it has made, due to
sometimes ineffective international police enforcement mechanisms.  In this second sense, par-
ticipation is voluntary because the state may choose to comply or not to comply.
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the problem being negotiated), then we should not expect our diplo-
mats to return home with the first-best treaty in their briefcases.  Of-
ten, however, our negotiators could do better than the records indi-
cate.
The problem is partly that our negotiators too often have a poor
conceptual understanding of the task at hand.  As will be explained
later, they are not helped by the sometimes confused and disjointed
literature, especially with regard to whether free riding is truly a
problem in creating international agreements.3  There is also dis-
agreement in the literature about whether compliance is a problem—
and, in particular, whether “sticks” are needed to deter noncompli-
ance.  The purpose of this article is to try to make sense of the nego-
tiators’ problem by discussing what makes international agreements
work and how they can be made to work better.
This article begins by defining the international cooperation
problem and distinguishing it from other problems requiring negotia-
tion.  Part III then discusses the general remedies to this kind of
problem, and explains why judicial remedies cannot work for every
cooperation problem.  Part IV discusses specific remedies (i.e., inter-
national treaties) to specific problems.  Part V discusses whether
compliance with international agreements is a problem or not, and
Part VI distinguishes between compliance and participation.  The ar-
ticle further distinguishes participation from free riding in Part VII
and then in Part VIII it explains why, of all the problems, free-rider
deterrence is the hardest to fix.  Part IX distinguishes free riding from
the related problem of trade leakage.  Finally, the article summarizes
what all of this means for our negotiators.
II.  INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AS A PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
Problems of international cooperation involving regional or
global public goods, or regional or global commons problems, have
characteristics that are crudely captured by the famous Prisoners’
Dilemma (PD) game.4  Examples of such international problems are
the harvesting of migratory tuna, polluting of the Black Sea, protec-
tion of the ozone layer, conservation of biodiversity, and climate
change mitigation.  The focus of this article is concerned only with
3. See discussion infra Part VIII.
4. A description of this game may be found in any textbook on game theory.  For a dis-
cussion relevant to the subject of this article, see TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL CHALLENGES: AN
APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS 26-34 (1997).  In a
PD game, pursuit of self-interest by each player results in a collectively unsatisfying outcome.
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problems such as these, which, in their primitive forms, resemble the
PD, or at least have aspects captured by the PD
The most important feature of the PD with respect to interna-
tional public goods or commons problems is that the efficient out-
come may not be sustainable by a decentralized or anarchic interna-
tional system.5  For example, in the one-shot, single-round PD game,
decentralization is fatal to the collective good.6  More generally, those
outcomes that are welfare-superior (as compared to their anarchic
counterparts) must be sustained by an enforcement mechanism of
some kind.  In particular, cooperation can be sustained for even the
one-shot PD provided an agreement between the players can be en-
forced by a third party.  However, there is no third party that can ef-
fectively enforce agreements between countries.7
This is a basic point, but one that is routinely misunderstood.
For example, it is sometimes noted that many problems are more akin
to coordination games.8  Since efficient outcomes can be sustained in
coordination games by an anarchical system, extrapolation implies
that cooperation is not much of a challenge to the international sys-
tem.9  While it is true that many problems resemble coordination
games, the concern here is with problems that do not—problems that
share the essential features of the PD.  These problems are especially
difficult for the international system to remedy.
One of the differences between the PD and coordination games
is that, for the latter, players (here, countries) do not have dominant
strategies: what is best for one country to do depends on what the
others are doing.10  This is a common situation in international rela-
tions, but the coordination game is not unique in having this feature.
5. See id. at 132-43.
6. See id.  Cooperation may be sustained, however, by using a strategy of reciprocity. See
id. at 33-34, 132-34; see also ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 75-78 (1984).
7. See SANDLER, supra note 4, at 32; Douglass C. North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic
World: Institutional Economics, Property Rights, and the Global Environment, 10 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 1, 5 (1999).  International institutions such as the International Court of Justice
can pressure states to comply with treaty obligations.  However, there is no institution empow-
ered to intervene for the good of all and enforce compliance. See Scott Barrett, The Problem of
Global Environmental Protection, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Spring 1990, at 68, 69 (1990)
[hereinafter Barrett, Global Environmental Protection].
8. In a coordination game, every party wants to do what the others are doing. See
SANDLER, supra note 4, at 46-50.
9. See Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in
Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154, 155 (1984).
10. See SANDLER, supra note 4, at 49; Runge, supra note 9, at 161.
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Indeed, in richer, more complex PD-like games, states do not have
dominant strategies.  For example, if the marginal damage from pol-
lution is increasing, then as other states abate their pollution, it will
pay for each state to abate its emissions less at the expense of the oth-
ers.11
Confusingly, some problems share features of both kinds of
games.  For example, participation in a treaty may resemble a coordi-
nation game, and yet the problem addressed by the treaty may be a
PD.  This kind of situation can result when trade sanctions are used to
sustain cooperation in an international agreement.  With sanctions
imposed on non-signatories, every party prefers to participate if a sig-
nificant number of others do as well.  This resembles the coordination
game.  However, if the treaty also requires that the parties supply the
public good, then this resembles the PD game.12
It is important to note, however, that there are features of the
PD that are not important to my analysis.  In the international rela-
tions literature, it is common to model the PD as being played by two
states, each having a binary choice.13  These requirements can and
should be relaxed.  In a world of approximately 190 countries, it is a
gross error to assume that all PD-type games are played by just two
countries.  Indeed, there is a huge qualitative difference between two-
player and three-player PD games.
The ability of a treaty to sustain full cooperation depends on the
nature of the problem.  One dimension to the problem is the number
of countries affected by the commons problem.  It turns out that re-
gional problems are easier to remedy partly because regional coop-
eration problems involve a small number of countries and partly be-
cause neighbors interact more frequently, allowing reciprocity to
flourish.14
11. For a more in-depth discussion of the issue, see Scott Barrett, Self-Enforcing Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 878 (1994).  Other kinds of inter-
dependencies are possible as well.  For example, the marginal cost of abatement for each coun-
try could be decreasing in the abatement undertaken by others.  Then, as others abate more, it
will pay each country to abate its emissions by more, too.  However, in this case, the underlying
game would not be a PD. See Geoffrey Heal, Formation of International Environmental Agree-
ments, in TRADE, INNOVATION, ENVIRONMENT 301, 308-19 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1994).
12. See generally Scott Barrett, The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environ-
mental Agreements, 19 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 345 (1997).
13. See, e.g., ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND
CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1990) (providing multiple examples of the prisoners’
dilemma).
14. This is a familiar insight, perhaps first drawn to our attention by Mancur Olson in 1965,
but the mechanisms that support it have only recently been elucidated. See MANCUR OLSON,
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Moreover, it is neither essential nor reasonable to assume that all
choices are binary (even though it is sometimes analytically conven-
ient to do so).  For example, feasible pollution abatement can range
from zero to one hundred percent.  The important binary choice is
between being a party and a nonparty to an international treaty
(though even here there are gray areas).
III.  GENERAL REMEDIES
States cooperate through treaties, and there are lots of them—
close to 200 multilateral agreements and many more bilateral
treaties.15  Treaties are specific remedies, however, and it might seem
that there should be a more elegant and general remedy.  For
example, why not simply allocate rights, pursuant to the Coase
Theorem, to all the earth’s resources and let bargaining take care of
the rest?16
Of course, to some extent, rights to the earth’s resources—and to
the resources of outer space—are allocated by international law.17
Customary law, for example, determines the limit of the territorial
sea, while at the same time safeguarding the right to innocent pas-
sage.  Moreover, the legal mechanism of international law has
evolved to aid in our management of transnational natural resources.
The extension of the territorial limit from three to twelve miles, for
example, was motivated partly by the severe depletion of near-shore
fisheries.  Similarly, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was
created to bring ocean resources adjacent to sovereign territory under
the control of municipal governments.  Together, these measures
have effectively nationalized most of the world’s commercial fisher-
JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65
(rev. ed. 1971) (1965); see generally Scott Barrett, A Theory of Full International Cooperation,
11 J. THEORETICAL POL. 519 (1999) [hereinafter Barrett, Full International Cooperation].
15. See Scott Barrett, Economic Analysis of International Environmental Agreements: Les-
sons for a Global Warming Treaty, in RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED
ECONOMIC ISSUES 109, 137-44 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. ed., 1991) (providing a
list of agreements); but cf. David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an
Effective Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 151 & n.6 (1999) (pro-
viding his own count of multilateral environmental agreements).
16. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960) (illustrating
the classic invariance proposition).  The Coase Theorem says that, irrespective of the initial al-
location of rights, as long as rights are vested in one of the two parties, trade will ensure that the
final allocation of resources is Pareto efficient, as long as there are no transaction costs. See id.
Of course, Coase recognized that this general application of the theorem named after him is not
possible, because in the real world there are positive transaction costs. See id. at 15 (stating that
the assumption of zero transaction costs is “very unrealistic”).
17. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 258-86 (4th ed.
1990).
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ies.18  Although straddling fish stocks and migratory species still pose
a problem that necessitates international treaties, the above changes
in property rights have removed certain problems from being man-
aged within the constraints of self-enforcement.  A good example is
the Icelandic fishery.  Iceland extended its claim to this resource from
three to four miles in 1930; from four to twelve miles in 1958; from
twelve to fifty miles in 1972; and from fifty to two hundred miles in
1975.  Eventually, Iceland’s claim was recognized for being compati-
ble with the evolving custom regarding territorial limits.  Conse-
quently, Iceland has been able to deter foreign entry to this important
fishery and manage the resource better.19
This type of allocation of rights, however, has limits.  Countries
that share a regional sea, for example, have little to gain from a 200-
mile territorial limit.  Having sole jurisdiction to a piece of a sea is of
no help if the fish within it disperse evenly or if pollution that enters
the sea mixes uniformly.  Consequently, not every state has claimed
an EEZ.20  Such resources—including rivers that either border or run
through different states, regional air sheds, and migratory animal spe-
cies—often must be shared.
Even if rights to such resources could be allocated (for example,
the whole of an inland sea could be given to a single country), no
simple rule will suffice to please all parties.  Customary international
law states that shared resources should be subject to “equitable utili-
zation,” but the law is silent on what makes for an equitable alloca-
tion.21  This ambiguity is inevitable, because what is equitable will de-
pend on the specifics of a particular case and therefore must be
decided by negotiation.  On the other hand, while customary law is
unable to allocate every environmental resource, it can nationalize
some resources and focus the attentions of parties in the direction
that negotiations should take.
18. Both the 12-mile territorial limit and the EEZ, which may extend up to 200 miles, are
codified in the Law of the Sea Conventions.  The territorial sea is an extension of a state’s land
mass with the exception that foreign vessels are allowed innocent passage.  A state also has
rights to its EEZ.  However, other states have the right to fly over and lay cables in this terri-
tory.  A state must actually claim an EEZ for it to be recognized in international law. See
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 348-49, 359-63 (3d ed. 1991).
19. See MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 158-73 (1997).
20. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 116 (1992).
21. See id. at 127.
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So, while at first blush, it might seem that allocating property
rights and allowing Coasean bargaining to occur might be the general
solution to global commons problems, this general remedy falls short.
The desirable outcome promised by the Coase Theorem requires
more than a full specification of property rights; it also requires en-
forcement by a third party.  Even if the former requirement were sat-
isfied, the latter cannot be, because third party enforcement of con-
tracts (treaties) is not countenanced by the international system.  This
is the real problem and what distinguishes international from local
commons problems.
IV.  SPECIFIC REMEDIES
Of course, nothing prevents countries from negotiating an
agreement in which rights are allocated—either an initial allocation,
which may subsequently be redistributed by trading (as in the 1997
Kyoto Protocol), or a final allocation (as in the Rhine Chlorides Con-
vention of 1976).22  The harder problem is figuring out how to ensure
full participation in the agreement effecting an allocation and how to
enforce an allocation.  This is a widely misunderstood distinction.  As
evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiators of this agreement
were preoccupied with negotiating targets and timetables rather than
enforcement or participation mechanisms.  This was a mistake.23  If
effective enforcement mechanisms are omitted, and cannot be in-
cluded subsequently, then the targets and timetables so painstakingly
negotiated may not be met.  If participation is narrow, the agreement
may not enter into force; and even if it does enter into force, it may
achieve less than anticipated.
Negotiating allocations is a challenge, but it is a problem for
which solutions exist.  Provided there is a total gain to cooperation,
then with the help of compensating payments (side payments), states
can negotiate an allocation that, when compared to the alternative of
22. See Scott Barrett, Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol, OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y, Winter 1998, at 20, 29-30 [hereinafter Barrett, Political Economy of Kyoto]; DAVID G.
LEMARQUAND, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: THE POLITICS OF COOPERATION 108-18 (1977)
(discussing the Rhine Chlorides Agreement).  The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty to
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Agenda
Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (not yet in force)
(84 signatories and 22 Parties as of Jan. 20, 2000), available at <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/
docs/cop3/l07a01.htm>.  The Rhine Chlorides Agreement seeks to reduce emissions of salts into
the Rhine and allocates the costs among its parties. See Convention on the Protection of the
Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 265 (1977).
23. See Barrett, Political Economy of Kyoto, supra note 22, at 20-21.
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having no cooperation at all, makes every country better off.  It may
also be important that coalitions of countries have incentives to par-
ticipate.  Chander and Tulkens have shown that, in certain circum-
stances, at least one allocation exists that no coalition would want to
reject (that is, an allocation that lies at the core of the game). 24
In general, negotiating allocations is a simpler problem as com-
pared with enforcement.  When an agreement must be enforced by
credible mechanisms and where it is in the interests of the countries
to actually carry out their threat when called upon to do so, compen-
sating payments by themselves have virtually no effect on the out-
comes that can be sustained.25  This may come as a surprise to anyone
familiar with the Montreal Protocol.26  Research suggests that the side
payments in this agreement mainly helped by “ratcheting up” the co-
operation problem; that is, the agreement shifted the cooperation
problem from reducing the emissions of industrialized countries to
getting these countries to pay developing countries to reduce their
emissions.27  The binding constraint was not enforcing provision of the
public good by rich countries.  Rather, the binding constraint was en-
forcing provision of compensating payments by rich countries to
make participation attractive to poor countries. 28
V.  COMPLIANCE
There are a number of reasons to think that compliance with in-
ternational agreements is not a problem, perhaps the most important
being that the actual record of compliance is exemplary.29  But what
should we make of this?  One interpretation is that compliance is en-
forced by the custom requiring states to comply with the treaties they
24. See Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, The Core of an Economy with Multilateral En-
vironmental Externalities, 26 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 379, 399 (1997).
25. See Scott Barrett, International Cooperation for Sale (1999) (unpublished mimeo, Paul
H. Nitze Sch. of Advanced Int’l Stud., Johns Hopkins Univ.) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Barrett, International Cooperation].
26. The Montreal Protocol is an international agreement that reduces the production and
consumption of substances that deplete the stratosphere ozone layer. See Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1989) (banning trade in ozone-depleting substances between Parties and non-
Parties).  For a fascinating study of the negotiation of this agreement, see RICHARD ELLIOT
BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (2d. ed.
1998).
27. For more on this issue, see Barrett, International Cooperation, supra note 25.
28. See BENEDICK, supra note 26, at 252-55.
29. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175,
176 (1993).
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sign.  Though the punishment for breaking with this customary law is
not specified, it is real.  A damaged reputation resulting from non-
compliance can make it difficult for a deviant to enter into future
agreements.  Even a single deviation carries the risk of precipitating
general erosion in law abidance, to the detriment of all states.  This is
one of the reasons why even states unaffected by an act of noncom-
pliance may nonetheless take measures that have the effect of pun-
ishing a deviant.30
This reasoning seems all the more compelling given that few
treaties specify explicit punishments, or “sticks,” for noncompliance.31
It even invites the conclusion that treaty-specific “sticks” for non-
compliance are not needed and may even be counterproductive.32
However, the same facts are open to a different interpretation.  Per-
haps countries only sign agreements they would be happy to comply
with unilaterally, or perhaps compliance is not a problem because the
obligations imposed on parties are so weak as to eliminate any incen-
tive not to comply.33  However, the analyses that support these op-
posing positions are incomplete.  They either ignore the problem of
enforcing participation or conflate the twin problems of noncompli-
ance and nonparticipation.  These are related but different problems
and should be analyzed jointly.
VI.  COMPLIANCE VS. PARTICIPATION
A country only needs to comply with a treaty to which it is a
party.34  Upon giving sufficient notice of an intention to withdraw
from an agreement, a state is released from the legal obligation of
having to comply.  Therefore, if nonparticipation cannot be deterred,
then compliance with an agreement becomes a moot issue.  The de-
terrence of both nonparticipation and noncompliance are thus inter-
linked.
Noncompliance will only be deterred if the act of noncompliance
is punished.  However, although it is easy to threaten to impose a
huge punishment for noncompliance, it is harder to make such a
30. For a game-theoretic demonstration of this, see Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and
Community Enforcement, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 63 (1992).
31. See Victor, supra note 15, at 150 n.3.
32. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 29-33(1995); Victor, supra
note 15, at 163-64.
33. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 380, 383 (1996); Victor, supra note 15, at 152-57.
34. See SHAW, supra note 18, at 579.
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threat credible, because punishing noncompliance usually harms the
countries that carry out the punishment as well.  For example, larger
deviations offer larger rewards to the deviant and so can only be de-
terred by the threat to impose stiffer punishments.  Unfortunately,
the larger the punishment, the greater the cost of enforcement to the
countries called upon to punish the deviant.35
Consider the largest, credible deviation that needs to be de-
terred.  This involves a participant (and would-be deviant) choosing
the same provision level that it would choose if it were a nonpartici-
pant.  Deterring such a deviation requires a large punishment.  But if
the required punishment is credible, then this unilateral deviation can
be deterred.  Furthermore, any smaller act of noncompliance can be
deterred by smaller punishments, and small punishments are more
credible.  Thus, if an agreement can deter nonparticipation at the
margin, then it will easily be able to deter noncompliance at the mar-
gin.  Once nonparticipation has been deterred, noncompliance will be
deterred free-of-charge.36
If this reasoning is correct, then the compliance problem needs to
be interpreted differently.  “Sticks” will be needed to enforce compli-
ance, as well as to enforce participation.  Indeed, there should be a
natural connection between these punishments.  As explained below,
nonparticipation in the Montreal Protocol has been deterred by the
threat to impose trade sanctions against nonparties.  Although the
compliance mechanism in this treaty was left unspecified, when Rus-
sia threatened noncompliance, the parties to this remarkable treaty
threatened to punish Russia by restricting trade.  The threat was more
implicit than explicit, but it worked all the same.37
VII.  PARTICIPATION VS. FREE RIDING
It is a rule of international law that participation in a treaty is
voluntary.38  Indeed, having the right to choose between participating
or not is one of the most important aspects of statehood.  We are ac-
customed to thinking of free riding as being manifest in nonparticipa-
tion.  However, this reasoning can be misleading.39  It is possible for
countries to negotiate by consensus, for every country with a stake in
35. See Barrett, Full International Cooperation, supra note 14, at 522.
36. See id. at 533-37.
37. See BENEDICK, supra note 26, at 280-86.
38. See SHAW, supra note 18, at 561-64.
39. See Scott Barrett, Consensus Treaties (1999) (unpublished mimeo, Paul H. Nitze Sch.
of Advanced Int’l Stud., Johns Hopkins Univ.) (on file with author).
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an outcome of an agreement to be a party to it, and yet for free riding
to remain a problem.  In a consensus treaty, free riding is manifest in
every party providing too little of the public good.  This occurs be-
cause participation cannot be enforced if provision levels are larger,
and deviations from an agreement specifying larger provision levels
require larger punishments that are not credible.  Moreover, coun-
tries may be better off by choosing to negotiate by consensus.  A con-
sensus treaty is especially appealing when the total cost of public
good provision falls as the level of participation increases (as would
be true of climate change mitigation).  In the debate between having
a “narrow but deep” versus a “broad but shallow” treaty, this logic
commends the latter for this kind of problem.
There are certain forces that push in the direction of a consensus
treaty.  One is the customary law requiring countries to cooperate
(though not requiring that they be parties to an agreement, let alone
that they undertake efficient provision).40  Another is the desire on
the part of countries to conform, or to behave as others behave.41  The
results noted above show that full participation may result despite
these influences.
VIII.  FREE RIDING
Since noncompliance can be deterred, and full participation can
be sustained, we are left with the conclusion that the problem of in-
ternational cooperation is the deterrence of free riding.  However, al-
though free riding has long occupied the attention of scholars in both
international relations42 and economics,43 its importance is too often
minimized.  Some even dismiss free riding as irrelevant, believing that
most issues only require coordination or that free riding cannot be a
problem since international agreements often generate full participa-
tion.44  Economists sometimes make assumptions that have the effect
of shooting the problem dead.  For example, in some papers, it is
deemed reasonable for agreements to be enforced by punishments
40. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 20, at 83.
41. See Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, Incentives to Participate in an International En-
vironmental Agreement, 9 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 153, 155 (1997).
42. See e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 6; Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Re-
lations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 12-13 (1986); Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Coop-
eration Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 234-38 (1985).
43. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 4; Barrett, Global Environmental Protection, supra note
7.
44. See Runge, supra note 9, at 157.
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that are not credible or for countries to make commitments not to
withdraw from an agreement.45
There is a much deeper reason for thinking that free riding is not
a problem.  The folk theorems of repeated games tell us that if the
players in PD games are sufficiently patient and if they can expect to
meet again in the future, then any feasible outcome can be sustained
(as a sub-game perfect equilibrium) by the anarchic international sys-
tem.46  However, the notion behind such an equilibrium is inappropri-
ate to the study of international cooperation because it assumes that
the parties to an international agreement cannot renegotiate.  In re-
ality, they can and indeed they often do renegotiate.  The Montreal
Protocol, for example, has been renegotiated several times in the last
ten years.
If you relax this constraint and allow parties to renegotiate
agreements, then the usual folk theorem result ceases to hold when
the number of players in the PD game exceeds two.  When there are
three or more players, it may not be possible to devise a self-
enforcing treaty capable of sustaining full cooperation.47  Some kind
of second-best fallback must be accepted instead.
Moreover, this result depends on the payoff functions for these
players.  It matters, for example, whether the benefit of abatement is
increasing or decreasing.  The parameter values for the relationships
can also matter.  An important yet depressing result is that coopera-
tion is often harder to achieve when the gains that can spring from it
are largest.  This is because it is precisely under these circumstances
that stiff penalties are needed to deter free riding.  Stiff penalties, as
mentioned previously, are often not credible.
IX.  FREE RIDING VS. LEAKAGE
How can credibility be augmented in order to deter non-
participation?  It is natural to turn to the success of the Montreal Pro-
tocol for inspiration.  This agreement, it will be recalled, relies on
45. See, e.g., Chander & Tulkens, supra note 24, at 379; Carlo Carraro & Domenico Sinis-
calco, Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 309
(1993).
46. For a more in-depth discussion of the topic, see Barrett, Full International Cooperation,
supra note 14.
47. See generally Barrett, Full International Cooperation, supra note 14.
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trade sanctions to deter non-participation.48  Could this mechanism be
replicated for other international treaties?
Before answering this question, three related observations need
to be made.  First, the Montreal Protocol sanctions may violate the
rules of the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
thus be subject to challenge under the World Trade Organization
(WTO).49  As of yet, this is not a legal problem, because no country
has complained to the WTO about the Montreal sanctions.  However,
it is pretty obvious that the sanctions violate the principle of non-
discrimination.  It seems inevitable that some kind of deal will need to
be negotiated in the future to reconcile WTO principles with the need
to sustain environmental agreements.
Second, if a trade sanction works well, then it will never need to
be implemented.  If the threat to impose the sanction is credible, and
if the sanction is big enough to deter “cheating,” then cheating will
never occur.  Sanctions, therefore, will never need to be imposed.
Third, it can only be acceptable to impose sanctions against free-
riders, as opposed to nonparticipants.  Some countries may damage
the environment but have no interest in protecting it.  The threat of
sanctions may make these countries reduce their emissions, but such
an outcome would not necessarily be “fair.”  In the Montreal Proto-
col, compensating payments to pay for the compliance costs of devel-
oping countries help to make the threat to impose sanctions in this
agreement “fair.”50  This is one important reason why the use of
“sticks” often needs to be accompanied by the use of “carrots” (or
compensating payments).
However, trade sanctions are not the easy answer to most envi-
ronmental problems.  One reason is that trade sanctions will not al-
ways be credible.  Like other strategies of reciprocity, trade sanctions
may harm the countries that impose them as well as those who re-
ceive them.  Trade sanctions are credible for the Montreal Protocol
mainly because of the worry about “trade leakage”—that, as some
countries reduce their production and consumption of ozone-
48. See Scott Barrett, Montreal v. Kyoto: International Cooperation and the Global Envi-
ronment, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
192, 211-13 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Barrett, Montreal v. Kyoto].
49. See DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 81
(1996).  On the topic of whether the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol regarding allocation and
trading of emission allowances may be subject to challenge under the WTO, see Annie Petsonk,
The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading
into the Global Marketplace, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185 (1999).
50. See Barrett, Montreal v. Kyoto, supra note 48, at 210-11.
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depleting substances, output and usage will simply shift to non-
participants.  Ironically, although leakage exacerbates free riding in
the sense that it frustrates unilateral efforts to provide a public good,
it also contains the ingredient needed to deter free riding in a multi-
lateral agreement.51
Another reason is that for some environmental problems—cli-
mate change mitigation being the most obvious—sanctions might
need to be applied very broadly.  The production of all goods and
services results in emission of greenhouse gases.  To reduce leakage,
some kind of border tax adjustment would probably be needed.  But
this would be impractical.  It is virtually impossible to work out, for
each traded good, the emissions resulting from its manufacture.  Im-
portantly, though the Montreal Protocol threatens to impose sanc-
tions on trade in products made using ozone-depleting substances,
such an action has not been taken and has not proven necessary.52
For climate change, it would seem essential, and yet the consequence
may be a threat to the multilateral trading system.  This would be an
unhappy tradeoff.  Ozone depletion and climate change mitigation
are different problems, and cannot be solved using a one-size-fits-all
treaty.53
X.  CONCLUSION
All the answers to global commons problems have certainly not
been settled.  However, a useful theory should prompt us to ask the
right questions.  The negotiators in Kyoto, for example, should have
started by asking what kind of agreement on climate change mitiga-
tion could be enforced.  Only after this question was answered should
they have negotiated allocations or other policy actions.  In this way,
they could be sure that the obligations in the treaty could be enforced
and that the required level of participation would be reached.  In-
stead, the Kyoto negotiators lavished more attention on the setting of
emission limits with little thought given to participation and enforce-
ment.  The unfortunate consequence may be an agreement that fails
to enter into force or that fails to be sustained after having entered
into force.  Ultimately, the issues addressed in this article will have to
51. See generally Scott Barrett, The Credibility of Trade Sanctions in International Envi-
ronmental Agreements, in TRADE, GLOBAL POLICY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 161 (World Bank
Discussion Paper No. 402, Per G. Fredriksson ed., 1999).
52. See BRACK, supra note 49, at 81.
53. See Barrett, Montreal v. Kyoto, supra note 48, at 192-94.
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be faced—either in subsequent conferences among the parties or in
renegotiations of the agreement.
